This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled out (...) with the translator's critical Introduction, "The esoteric Quine?" a bibliography based on Quine's sources, and an Index for the volume. (shrink)

With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar--but argues against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar or language. Rather, in presenting a general theory of grammar and discussing the boundaries and possible extensions of logic, Quine argues that logic is not a mere matter of words.

Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...

Our only channel of information about the world is the impact of external forces on our sensory surfaces. So says science itself. There is no clairvoyance. How, then, can we have parlayed this meager sensory input into a full-blown scientific theory of the world? This is itself a scientific question. The pursuit of it, with free use of scientific theory, is what I call naturalized epistemology. The Roots of Reference falls within that domain. Its more specific concern, within that domain, (...) is reference to concrete and abstract objects: what such reference consists in, and how we achieve it. (shrink)

In this second lecture, Quine provides a further rational reconstruction of human progress from sensory stimulation to our current scientific theory. This project consists in his further speculations concerning how we have acquired cognitive language. Here, Quine talks of observation sentences and explains how he thinks they can be learned by ostension. This leads him to further speculate concerning how we could master standing sentences, predication and the use of relative clauses. At this stage the language learner has acquired a (...) grammar that is equivalent to first order predicate calculus, which Quine famously advocates as the canonical framework for the language of science. He elaborates on the nature of objective reference, emphasizing that this appears with the predication of general terms since only then are things separated from the terms that name them. (shrink)

The lectures conclude with Quine’s reflections on significance or insignificance of ontology. He develops his arguments for the relativity of ontology and explains how this relativity emerges from an appreciation of the looseness of fit between reception and perception and the further recognition that all reification is theoretical. Given the kind of freedom that comes with the specification of an ontology, Quine concludes that the importance of theory is not to be found in the objects that it posits. Rather it (...) is found in the structural relations between its terms and sentences and observation sentences. The links between theory and observation are found in the recurrence of observation sentences or their parts in theoretical sentences. What these sentences refer to, in their capacity as terms, becomes unimportant. (shrink)